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MarketWatch
Medicare Payment Policy: Does Cost Shifting
Matter?
It matters to consumers, who face the ultimate cost shift when prices
rise without compensating rises in payment rates.
by Jason S. Lee, Robert A. Berenson, Rick Mayes, and Anne K. Gauthier
ABSTRACT: We examine cost shifting within the context of Medicare payment policy. We
briefly review economic theory and available data and discuss the importance of cost shift-
ing for policy. Then we present four central findings on cost shifting based on the views of
former high-level policymakers. First, Medicare’s early (pre-prospective) payment policy was
a boon to hospitals. Second, Medicare payment policy is a “top-down” affair, driven by bud-
getary and special-interest politics. Third, federal policymakers may not consciously con-
sider cost shifting, but state policymakers do. Fourth, Medicare payment policy requires
constant adjustment, but we are “getting it right” most of the time.
F
or at least th irty years there
has been no agreement on whether the
federal government should develop
health care payment policies that address
only the costs of public programs, especially
Medicare and Medicaid, or whether such pol-
icies should broadly address inflationary cost
pressures across the health care system. In the
early 1970s the Nixon administration placed
wage and price controls on the entire econ-
omy but kept controls on health care services
even after the controls on other sectors of the
economy had been withdrawn. A central
premise of the Carter administration’s hospi-
tal cost containment legislation was that cost
controls had to be applied to all payers. In-
deed, a major reason for its defeat in Congress
was the all-payer approach. In enacting the
inpatient hospital prospective payment sys-
tem (PPS) for Medicare in 1983, the Reagan
administration and Congress went in the
other direction, applying a Medicare-specific
cost containment strategy for hospital spend-
ing. In subsequent years such approaches
were adopted for physician services and for
most other provider types.1
A central question raised in evaluating
Medicare payment policies is who actually
bears the burden of payment reductions: pro-
viders alone, whose reimbursement rates are
directly reduced, or payers as well, particularly
private employers who sponsor health insur-
ance for their employees. In general, do provid-
ers “shift costs”—that is, raise prices to one set
of payers in response to lower prices from an-
other? And, in the case of Medi- care, do hospi-
tals and physicians respond to federally initi-
ated payment reductions by shifting costs to
H e a l t h T r a c k i n g
W 3 - 4 8 0 8 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3
DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.W3.480 ©2003 Project HOPE–The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.
Jason Lee (Lee-Jason@norc.net)is principal senior adviser at the National Organization for Research at Chicago
(NORC) in Washington, D.C., and president of Health Policy Consulting LLC in Bethesda, Maryland. Bob
Berenson is senior fellow at the Urban Institute in Washington. Rick Mayes is an assistant professor of public pol-
icy at the University of Richmond (Virginia) Department of Political Science. Anne Gauthier is a vice-president at
AcademyHealth in Washington, D.C.
private payers? Do those who make Medicare
payment policy care?
In this paper we summarize the debate on
cost shifting, which economic theory says
should not happen but empirical data do not
rule out. To illustrate the latter point, we then
focus on payment trends for hospitals, a major
stakeholder in cost-shifting dynamics.2 We do
not attempt to resolve the debate empirically.
Instead, we reflect on cost shifting from a pol-
icy perspective by drawing on the expert opin-
ion of former high-ranking public officials.3
We show that the debate on cost shifting is
part of a much broader policy discussion about
administered pricing and the role of govern-
ment in setting health care payment rates. The
Medicare program is our central focus. We
emphasize four central findings that inform
current discussions about cost shifting and
Medicare payment policy.
Economic Theory
In his paper on economic theory and cost
shifting, which accompanies our paper on the
Health Affairs Web site, Paul Ginsburg defines
cost shifting as “the phenomenon in which
changes in administered prices of one payer
lead to compensating changes in prices
charged to other payers.” He argues there is no
“correct” definition of the term and opts for
one that is most useful to policymakers.4 Al-
though there is nothing inherently unidirec-
tional about the dynamic (initiated by a public
payer, affecting private providers and payers),
Ginsburg’s definition is consistent with our fo-
cus on Medicare payment policy.
In theory, cost shifting can occur only if two
conditions are met. First, the provider must
have sufficient market power to raise prices to
private payers, and second, the provider must
not have been fully exercising that power.5
Some economists argue, based on economic
theory, that cost shifting should not occur.
Providers with market power should be profit
maximizers, exercising their market power on
all payers at all times, and not selectively,
based on temporal financial conditions.
There has been a long-standing debate
about whether cost shifting, in fact, exists. Re-
searchers in the mid-1990s, reviewing data
from the late 1980s and early 1990s, could not
find evidence that hospitals shifted costs from
Medicare to private payers.6 According to
Michael Morrisey, “Cost shifting appears to
have died, killed off by new forms of insurance,
price competition among hospitals, and
greater cost consciousness in health care.”7
Other researchers reviewing data from the
same time period found that “without excep-
tion, for all hospital types during all time peri-
ods, lower Medicare prices were associated
with statistically significant increases in pri-
vate pay prices.”8
Trends In Hospital Costs And
Payments
Following passage of the inpatient hospital
PPS in 1983, Medicare’s rate of growth slowed
greatly.9 From 1986 to 1992 Medicare hospital
inpatient PPS margins declined rapidly (Ex-
hibit 1). During this period the annual rate of
increase in hospital revenue from Medicare
was less than hospital cost inflation (6.3 per-
cent versus 8.6 percent) but was higher from
private payers (10.9 percent). Although this
trend is consistent with the cost-shifting hy-
pothesis (when public payment declines, pri-
vate payment increases), it does not prove a
causal connection.
With surprising rapidity, managed care (in
various forms) came to dominate the private
market during the 1990s. Private payment as a
source of hospital revenue actually declined
each year from 1992 to 1997 (–0.7 percent).
Hospital cost inflation also declined during
this period, to 1.6 percent annually. Compared
with the previous period, the annual change in
Medicare payment also declined, but not as
sharply as private payment or hospital cost in-
flation. In fact, the pace of change in Medicare
payment (4.7 percent) was almost three times
that of hospital cost inflation.
Exhibit 2 displays a twenty-year perspec-
tive on change in payment-to-cost ratios by
private and public payers. Private payment ap-
pears to have cross-subsidized public payment
at a steady rate until around 1985.10 Then,
when public payment declined (as the PPS set
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in), private payment increased. This phenome-
non continued until the early 1990s, when
public payment began to increase and private
payment declined.
Today, with the return of double-digit
health care inflation, there is considerable belt
tightening in the public and private sectors.
Hospital margins are being squeezed from all
sides. With increasing frequency and to a
greater extent, the individual consumer is ex-
periencing cost shifting.11 We return to this is-
sue in the conclusion of this paper.
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EXHIBIT 1
Medicare Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System (PPS) Margins, 1986–1992
SOURCE: S. Guterman, “What Happens When Medicare Payments Decline? Putting Medicare into Perspective” (Presentation at
“When Public Payment Declines, Does Cost Shifting Occur? Hospital and Physician Responses,” sponsored by the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation and AcademyHealth, Washington, D.C., 13 November 2002).
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EXHIBIT 2
Hospital Payment-To-Cost Ratios, By Source Of Revenue, 1980–2001
SOURCES: S. Guterman, “What Happens When Medicare Payments Decline? Putting Medicare into Perspective” (Presentation at
“When Public Payment Declines, Does Cost Shifting Occur? Hospital and Physician Responses,” sponsored by the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation and AcademyHealth, Washington, D.C., 13 November 2002); and Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy (Washington: MedPAC, March 2003).
NOTES: The correlation between Medicare and private payment-to-cost ratios is –.81 from 1984 (after diagnosis-related groups,
or DRGs, were implemented) to 1996 (by which time private-sector managed care had exerted strong downward pressure on
price). The Medicaid–private payer correlation during the same period is .02.
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Why Is Cost Shifting Important?
The cost-shifting debate is important for
policy because it raises essential questions
about Medicare pricing decisions, which re-
verberate throughout the health care system.
Do concerns about private-sector cost shifting
influence Medicare payment policy making?
What drives Medicare payment policy? Is
Medicare solely intended to pay for senior citi-
zens’ medical care, or does it have additional
responsibilities? What do current program
payment policies tell us about this?
In November 2002 the Robert Wood John-
son Foundation (RWJF) sponsored an invita-
tional meeting to address these questions.12
Three speaker panels and an audience of re-
search and policy experts convened to con-
sider whether cost shifting occurs when pub-
lic payment declines. In turn, the panels
considered the question theoretically and em-
pirically, operationally, and from the perspec-
tives of former high-level policymakers who
held administrative and legislative roles that
gave them unique insights into the process and
determination of Medicare payment policy
and the role of cost shifting in it.13
As previously noted, some economists ar-
gue that cost shifting should not occur under
profit maximization assumptions. Empirically,
the cost-shifting question has not been re-
solved, as Ginsburg discusses in his paper. Re-
search studies present mixed findings that are
not obviously reconciled. As we illustrated
above, correlational data support cost shifting
but do not prove that it occurs. At the confer-
ence, experts with extensive experience in
hospital financial management, state health
care financing and management, physician
group practice, and actuarial consulting sup-
ported the view that cost shifting occurs, al-
though they agreed that the dynamics are any-
thing but simple.14 The panel of former
high-level policymakers contributed broad,
new insights on cost shifting. We take their es-
sential ideas about the questions posed at the
outset, supplement them with our understand-
ing of the issues, and present four primary pol-
icy implications of the cost-shifting debate.
Policy Implications
 Early Medicare payment policy put hos-
pitals in the pink. For many years Medicare’s
payment model was a boon to providers, espe-
cially hospitals, as it reimbursed them all of the
costs they incurred treating beneficiaries. This
changed during the 1980s, when aggregate
Medicare payment varied from a few percent-
age points below hospital costs to slightly
above costs to about 10 percent below costs late
in the decade (see Exhibit 2). During the same
period aggregate private-sector payments
changed in the opposite direction, thereby en-
abling hospitals to maintain stable profit mar-
gins. Clearly, change occurred in the 1980s in
the relative contribution of public and private
payments to hospital margins, but the net effect
was general equilibrium (Exhibit 3). Over time,
Medicare’s inpatient hospital PPS transformed
the hospital industry economically.
In addition, the program’s new payment
policy became a powerful tool for managing
the federal budget. According to Robert
Reischauer, who directed the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) between 1989 and 1995,
prior to the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of
1997, Medicare “was viewed as a ‘cash cow’
that was there to be milked for deficit reduc-
tion purposes…Congress by and large believed
that you should and could cut Medicare pay-
ments as long as access was not compromised.
And access, from the standpoint of institu-
tional providers, really had to do with what
[hospitals’] overall margins were.” As long as
hospital margins were positive, Reischauer ar-
gued, policymakers were not concerned with
the relative contributions of public versus pri-
vate payers.
 Medicare payment policy is a top-
down affair driven by budgetary politics.
Medicare’s PPS made it possible for policy-
makers to generate sizable budgetary “sav-
ings.” By restraining the annual increase in
diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment rates
below the “market basket” rate of medical in-
flation, the difference between what Medicare
actually paid and what it would have paid had
payment increases actually matched the mar-
ket basket was counted as budgetary savings
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by the CBO.15 Congress could then count these
savings toward deficit reduction or increased
spending in other parts of the federal budget.
From the mid-1980s to 1997, when sizable bud-
get deficits were an annual occurrence, Con-
gress repeatedly adjusted Medicare’s payment
policy in this manner as part of its effort to ex-
ert greater control over federal finances.
Budgetary politics is a top-down affair that
has subordinated Medicare policy to larger
budgetary issues. After the federal budget’s
overall expenditures and revenues are negoti-
ated between senior congressional leaders and
administration officials, committees in Con-
gress are given the task of making changes to
the programs for which they have responsibil-
ity. In effect, a committee works backward
from a target amount of deficit reduction to
the policy changes and cuts that achieve the
target. As former House Ways and Means
Committee Chief Health Counsel Charles N.
Kahn III put it, “At the end of the day…you get a
‘number’ from above and then you work up a
menu [of policy options]…that gets you to
where you need to be.”
The 1997 BBA exemplifies policymakers’
subordination of Medicare payment policies
to larger budgetary goals. Nancy-Ann DeParle,
former administrator of HCFA, now the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), noted that top administration officials
looked at multiple factors in adjusting pay-
ment policy when the BBA was negotiated.
However, they did not focus on the adequacy
of or interaction between private and public
health care spending. Instead, DeParle said,
the primary driver behind Medicare payment
policy changes enacted in the BBA was the
overall level of the federal budget deficit.
 Cost shifting differs by level of gov-
ernment. Given policymakers’ willingness to
adjust Medicare’s reimbursement system for
larger budgetary purposes, the question natu-
rally arises whether payment policy decisions
are based in any sense on the assumption that
a shortfall—resulting from Medicare’s under-
payment—will be compensated for by private
payers through hospitals’ use of cost shifting.
Do policymakers assume that hospitals shift
costs, set public payment rates artificially low,
and expect that private payers will make up
the difference? Neither DeParle nor Kahn be-
H e a l t h T r a c k i n g
W 3 - 4 8 4 8 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3
EXHIBIT 3
Hospital Gains And Losses, By Source Of Revenue, 1980–2000
SOURCE: S. Guterman, “What Happens When Medicare Payments Decline? Putting Medicare into Perspective” (Presentation at
“When Public Payment Declines, Does Cost Shifting Occur? Hospital and Physician Responses,” sponsored by the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation and AcademyHealth, Washington, D.C., 13 November 2002).
NOTES: The correlation between public and private sources of revenue is –.80 from 1980 to 2000, and –.83 from 1984 (after
diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs, were implemented) to 1996 (by which time private-sector managed care had exerted strong
downward pressure on price).
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lieves that high-level decisionmakers con-
sciously factor cost shifting into their determi-
nation of payment rates. Indeed, reflecting on
the BBA experience, DeParle said they did not
have “good enough data to…consider cost
shifting explicitly.”
Stuart Altman, who chaired the Prospec-
tive Payment Assessment Commission
(ProPAC, now subsumed into the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, or MedPAC)
for twelve years, maintained that state policy-
makers knowingly account for cost shifting
when setting Medicaid rates. State officials are
much more willing to underpay hospitals than
nursing homes. Why? “Because they know
[Medicaid] is only 10 percent of hospitals’ rev-
enues on the patient side, but it’s 60, 70, 80
percent of nursing homes’ revenues,” Altman
said. “Ultimately,” he continued, “the big cost
shifter is Medicaid.”16
Altman pointed out that Medicare does ex-
plicitly subsidize two hospital sectors whose
missions often overlap: teaching hospitals and
hospitals that constitute the nation’s safety net
of providers.17 In the teaching hospital sector,
Medicare provides two additional payment
types to hospitals with graduate medical edu-
cation (GME) programs to compensate for
their higher costs.18 The indirect medical edu-
cation (IME) adjustment, $3.7 billion in 1999,
pays the costs of treating sicker patients and
additional tests needed for training purposes.
Teaching hospitals also receive a direct medi-
cal education (DME) adjustment, $2.2 billion
in 1999, for training medical residents.19 As a
result, Medicare explicitly pays teaching hos-
pitals more than what it technically costs
those hospitals to provide care to Medicare pa-
tients. Policymakers continue to see this as a
worthwhile investment in part, said Altman,
because making teaching hospitals compete
with nonteaching hospitals on a cost basis
could lead to an overall reduction in access for
the poor and uninsured:
If we forced the teaching adjustment down to
what technically the regression equation sug-
gests we should pay them, we could force teach-
ing hospitals into very serious financial shape.
And we count on them to provide a dispropor-
tionate amount of uncompensated care. We
[also] count on them…to be subsidizing teaching
and education in different ways.
Similarly, Medicare’s disproportionate-
share hospital (DSH) program has, since 1986,
increased payment rates to safety-net hospi-
tals that provide a disproportionately large
share of health care to the poor, whose condi-
tions are often more severe than those of aver-
age patients and yet who are less able to pay.
This explicit adjustment costs approximately
$5 billion a year.20 In both cases—DSH and
GME payments—the public sector pays the
costs of care not otherwise covered by private
payers. However, these subsidies are illustra-
tions of a public program’s paying for public
goods rather than cost shifting per se.
 “We are getting it about right.” The
cost-shifting issue raises fundamental ques-
tions about the purpose of Medicare pay-
ments.21 Specifically, should these narrowly
cover only the cost of care incurred by Medi-
care beneficiaries, or should they help subsi-
dize care of non-Medicare patients, provide re-
sources for public goods (such as GME), and,
most generally, support health care delivery
systems for the entire community?
The Medicare Act explicitly required pay-
ments to providers to include both the indirect
and the direct costs of providing those ser-
vices, so that “the costs with respect to indi-
viduals covered by the insurance programs es-
tablished under this title will not be borne by
individuals not so covered, and the costs with
respect to individuals not so covered will not
be borne by such insurance programs.”22
As noted above, over time Congress did
provide explicit payments for specific other
purposes. In the case of support for GME,
Medicare subsidizes functions of teaching
hospitals that go beyond educating and train-
ing interns and residents; IME payments com-
pensate teaching hospitals for the higher costs
associated with their urban location, their
more severely ill caseload, and their dispropor-
tionate share of low-income patients.23
Nevertheless, except where there were spe-
cific statutory exceptions, Medicare payment
policy has been predicated on the principle
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that payments should cover only the costs of
care incurred by Medicare beneficiaries. Fur-
ther, until recently, almost all courts had
found—or at least had assumed—that Con-
gress enacted the Medicare program solely to
assist elderly and disabled beneficiaries.24
However, in 2000 the Supreme Court
greatly modified that traditional view in Fisher
v. United States, a fraud case that offered the
Court the opportunity of opining whether
participating hospitals receive actual benefits
from the Medicare program and not merely
compensation for services rendered.25 The
Court concluded in a 7–2 decision that Medi-
care “payments are made not simply to reim-
burse for treatment of qualifying patients but
to assist the hospital in making available and
maintaining a certain level and quality of med-
ical care, all in the interest of both the hospital
and the greater community.”26
What should Medicare pay providers? The
official position, according to Reischauer, now
vice-chairman of MedPAC, is that the program
ought to pay “the approved costs in full that
are incurred by efficient providers when they
offer necessary and appropriate care to Medi-
care beneficiaries…What this means in short is
that Medicare should not consider the level of
payments relative to costs that other purchas-
ers are paying providers. And it should set
rates as if it were in a sense the only payer.”
However, all of the former policymakers
agreed that it doesn’t appear to work this way
in practice. Instead of having rational analysis
driving Medicare payment policy debates, it
often comes down to budgetary and special-
interest politics, where the overall financial
well-being of providers, not just their Medi-
care margins, are invoked in political discourse
and decision making. As Kahn explained, “The
issue is what can the political market bear…
and how does that play out to all of the indi-
vidual payments?” He argued that very little of
“the great work that ProPAC, PPRC [Physician
Payment Review Commission], and ultimately
MedPAC have done over the years…actually
plays through to ultimate decisions” about
payment policies. Nevertheless, he acknowl-
edged that although payment policy decisions
are budget-driven, “public purpose is a piece
of it [too]…Special interests get involved, and
whether it’s the people that are pushing DSH
payments or indirect medical education…if
they push hard enough and are smart enough,
they affect the ultimate whole.” In short, Kahn
argued that the determination of Medicare
payment policy has little to do with market
prices and everything to do with politics.
In the end, Altman argued, “Medicare is do-
ing about right.” Reischauer agreed: “On aver-
age, I think we feel that Medicare…is paying
about right most of the time.” Reischauer and
DeParle observed that the program sets mil-
lions of prices and that there will inevitably be
mistakes. But, they concur, it is important to
keep an eye on mistakes around the margins
and make sure they don’t cause larger prob-
lems. DeParle concluded that policymakers
hope “there is an ability to make adjustments
and to get as many [payment decisions] as
close to being right as possible over time.” She
continued, “I guess you do assume some ratio-
nal behavior on the part of providers.”
D
oe s cost sh ift ing matter? The
answer varies, depending on the
power and position of actors in the
health care system. To date, the answer for
policymakers appears to be that payment
policy matters more and that as long as other
actors are not harmed, it need not be a central
concern. The answer for private payers and
hospitals (and other providers) depends on
both their market power and the level of
money in the system. The answer for consum-
ers, with the least power, is that cost shifting
matters increasingly.
In the foreseeable future, greatly increased
Medicare compensation is unlikely, given the
most recent budget estimates of “deficits as far
as the eye can see.”27 In addition, states are ex-
periencing their worst fiscal crises in years and
are straining under their Medicaid programs.
Employers face escalating premiums and a
limp economy and, by and large, are not ab-
sorbing the latest round of escalating health
care costs. Instead, they are reducing their
level of coverage, asking employees to share
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more costs, and some are ceasing to provide
coverage altogether.28
When providers’ prices rise and neither pub-
lic nor private payers’ compensation follows suit,
consumers pay more. The result is that people
lose coverage.29 This appears to be the ultimate
cost shift, and the issue deserves more public
and private attention and action than current
politics are likely to allow, at least for now.
This paper was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation’s Changes in Health Care Financing and
Organization (HCFO) Initiative. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge the able research assistance of Lisa
Fleisher.
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